

# The Philanthropist

PUBLISHED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE OHIO STATE ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY.

GAMALIEL BAILEY, Jr., Editor.

We are verily guilty concerning our brother . . . therefore is this distress come upon us.

SAMUEL A. ALLEY, Printer.

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CINCINNATI, TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1838.

WHOLE NO. 119.

## THE PHILANTHROPIST,

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## COMMUNICATIONS.

A FINE CHANCE FOR COLORED PEOPLE  
—LETTER OF S. WARNER.

Our readers were undoubtedly much interested  
with the letters of Mr. Warner, published in No.  
18 of the Philanthropist. The following letter will  
show that he has commenced operations. We  
commend it, together with the communication of  
A. Wattles, to the special attention of our colored  
friends, and of all who feel an interest in their  
welfare.—Ed. Phil.

Merced Co., April 23d, 1838.

MR. WATTLES:

Dear Sir:—After I wrote you, my business  
required more of my personal attention than I ex-  
pected, which delayed my journey to the West, so  
that I did not arrive here till Saturday evening,  
the 14th inst. My only inquiry now is, what can  
I do to promote the interests of the colored settle-  
ment in this place. The extent of the settlement,  
at present, would not enable me to put all the  
means I have into the engine. However, I am  
unwilling to abandon so important an enterprise,  
and have therefore thought best to get into some  
employment for the season by which I could sus-  
tain my family another year. The colored people  
here are so afraid of a Yankee that I cannot do any  
thing with them. Therefore, I wish to know of  
you how long you will give me the improvement  
of a piece of your land, say 20, 30 or 40 acres, as  
I may be able to clear. If my son comes out, I  
think we shall be able to get in 40 acres of wheat,  
by cutting the small and denuding the large tim-  
ber. Should your terms justify me, I will com-  
mence immediately and do what I can; and, should  
the anti-slavery societies of Portage, Genoa and  
Ashabola counties have the same view of the im-  
portance of this settlement that I have, there will  
be a steam-mill in operation here before next Sep-  
tember.

In another year it will be necessary to have the  
factory started. It can be abundantly supplied  
with wood as soon as it starts. The call for cloth  
is great through a large section of country. I am  
sure that I could find a location much more pro-  
mising for me; but I am desirous to spend a season  
to satisfy myself whether the enterprise can be  
sustained or not. At present I cannot see any in-  
surmountable difficulties, if we but act in unison.  
I shall remain in this section until I am satisfied  
that I can do good. Should my family think  
best to move here in the fall, we should wish to  
occupy your house in the woods till another can  
be provided, or we think best to abandon the ob-  
ject. We have eight children and must have a  
good school for them. My own wisdom is but  
foolishness, and therefore I can only do from day  
to day, such things as appear to me to be duty,  
believing that God will direct, as he will not for-  
sake so important a cause as the sufferings of the  
oppressed.

I shall wait an answer.

In bonds of affection, yours,

S. WARNER.

In answer to this letter, I have informed brother  
Warner that I will give him a lease of 40 acres for  
ten years, and also a deed of two acres. Three  
colored men in this city whose lands corner with  
mine, have each agreed to give two acres. So that  
he may have a lot of eight acres. One of them  
also will lease a lot of 40 acres for ten years to  
him. These lots are located on the cross-roads.  
I hope from what goes before, that the colored  
friends will see the necessity for moving into the  
settlement as soon as possible; for if we should  
fail of securing the advantages which brother War-  
ner now holds out, it will be many a long year be-  
fore another such opportunity offers. It is em-  
phatically a God-send to us. When and where  
was the like ever heard of before? A man moving  
his whole manufacturing establishment for the pur-  
pose of aiding the colored people in their efforts  
at elevation! What would be the effect on our co-  
lored population if in every settlement were car-  
ried on by them some profitable branch of manu-  
facturing? I leave the answer with my brethren.  
You have entered upon a new era. You must  
do some things this year, that you have never  
done before. You are ascending an inclined plane.  
Send your sons and your daughters to learn some  
manufacturing art, connected with a school, and  
they will never be dependent on the whims and  
caprices of their superiors for support. Move  
out into the country, buy land, seek those places  
where you can do best; or, to use a common saying—  
help yourselves, and your friends will like you  
the better—help yourselves by merit and indus-  
try, seek to become honorable by becoming  
useful—change the occupations of a menial for one  
of a more respectable character. No matter if it  
is not so lucrative, do it for your children, for your  
people, for your good name in the nation. Your  
character can never be changed, till you change it  
yourselves. Change of character supposes a  
change of habit, change of thought, change of feel-  
ing, and change of conduct. Those who are will-  
ing to do any thing, may send word to me at the  
anti-slavery office. It will soon be known whether  
your character for enterprise has been rightly  
judged of, by an observing community. An op-  
portunity like the present has never before occur-  
red for testing it. Time cannot be wasted, indi-  
viduals must let us know immediately what they  
will do. Brother Warner as well as myself feel  
that we must be acting some where. If the peo-  
ple of this settlement are not willing to come for-  
ward and sustain the enterprise, we must go to  
some other place where they are willing. I wish  
all, who own land in the settlement, would write  
me soon, at Cincinnati, and let me know how  
much they will do, and also when they will move  
out. Others who are interested, are requested to  
make donations. I have 160 acres of land, which  
I purchased for the express purpose of establish-  
ing a manual labor school for colored boys, (in par-  
ticular,) but not to exclude whites. I am now  
ready to give it to any society that will sustain  
a republican manual labor school upon it. If the  
friends of the colored people, or the colored peo-  
ple themselves, will aid in erecting suitable build-  
ings, a school of the character specified will be

opened and continued for ever, if practicable.  
The manufactory and the farm will go hand in  
hand with the school, if they can be once started.  
What say you, friends?

A. WATTLES.

## SILK.

Connecticut gives a bounty on every one hun-  
dred mulberry trees cultivated for five years, and  
fifty cents on every pound of silk reeled on an im-  
proved reel.

Massachusetts gives a bounty of ten cents per lb.  
on cocoons, fifty cents per pound on reeled silk,  
and fifty cents on throwing.

Vermont gives ten cents on every pound of co-  
coons raised.

Maine gives a bounty of five cents on every  
pound of cocoons, and fifty cents on every pound  
of silk reeled.

The Legislature of Maryland have passed an  
act giving a bounty of one dollar on every one  
hundred Chinese mulberry trees five years old,  
planted for the purpose of feeding the silk worm.  
They also give a bounty of ten cents on every  
pound of cocoons, and fifty cents for every pound  
of raw silk reeled.

The Legislature of New York have passed a  
bill granting a bounty of ten cents on every pound  
of cocoons, and fifty cents on every pound of  
raw silk reeled.

In the year ending 30th September, 1836, the  
silk imported for home consumption amounted to  
\$22,136,954.

This can be supplied by domestic manufacture  
as easily as the cotton market has been.

Augustus Wattles addressed the A. S. Soc. at  
Red Oak, on Wednesday last. At the close of the  
meeting, committees were appointed to take up a  
subscription for the O. A. S. S., and also to collect  
money to defray the expenses of the prosecution  
of the kidnappers of Eliza Jane Johnson.

Rev. John Rankin was appointed a delegate to  
the yearly meeting. Mr. Rankin will read an  
essay on the varieties of the human race, or "The  
Causes of Color."

Warren Co., O., March 7, 1838.

Dear Sir:—On the 1st of June last, the Anti-  
Slavery Society of Dick's Creek and Monroe, was  
organized by the election of officers, a Constitution  
of the usual kind having been previously adopted  
by the members. Dr. Joshua Stevens,  
of Monroe, was chosen Pres.; W. W. Caldwell,  
Rec. Sec.; and A. McFarlane, Cor. Sec.

The following resolutions were adopted unani-  
mously.

1. Resolved, That slavery is a great evil, moral  
and political, and that the only just, safe and ef-  
fectual remedy is immediate emancipation.

2. Resolved, That the project of southern slave-  
holders to annex Texas to the United States, to  
secure the ascendancy to slave-holding in the  
councils of the nation, ought to meet with the dis-  
approbation and opposition of every friend to the  
liberties and welfare of this country.

3. Resolved, That the religion which sustains  
attempts to justify slavery, contradicts and dishon-  
ors both the law and the gospel, infringes upon  
the authority of God, and the rights of men,  
gives encouragement to the exercise of the worst  
passions of human nature, and to the perpetuation  
of the greatest enormities which spring from them.

4. Resolved, That the late proceedings in Al-  
ton, Ill., terminating in the murder of the lamented  
Lovejoy, discover in a strong but true light the  
spirit by which slave-holders and their allies are  
actuated, and show that they will not hesitate at  
the commission of any crime in support of their  
"peculiar institution."

5. Resolved, That the freedom of the North  
cannot consist with the slavery of the South; and  
that if the slave-holding influence should prepon-  
derate in the Union, we have reason to apprehend  
that the right of petition, and the liberty of speech  
and of the press will be utterly prostrated.

6. Resolved, That it is the imperative and in-  
dispensable duty of every man to bear his decided  
testimony against the wicked system of American  
slavery, and to use every scriptural and constitu-  
tional means to effect its entire abolition.

At a subsequent meeting, the Society resolved to  
become auxiliary to the Ohio A. S. Society, and  
directed that an account of the formation and pro-  
ceedings of this Society be communicated to the  
Philanthropist.

Yours respectfully,

A. McFARLANE, Cor. Sec.

We entertain the hope that our Society will in-  
crease in strength and efficiency; and be able to  
exert a salutary influence upon public sentiment  
in this region. We are confident that the truth  
and the right, however overborne for a time by  
obstinate prejudice and sordid avarice, will finally  
prevail. We anticipate the formation of a popular  
sentiment, which slavery with all its brazen im-  
pudence will not be able to confront. Even now  
the prevalent judgment of christendom is strongly  
condemnatory of the wicked and shameful  
practice of American slavery. Slavery has suc-  
ceeded in surrounding itself with an atmosphere  
so polluted and pestilential, that liberty sickness  
and dies within its limits. But as we recede from  
the poisoned region, we find that the atmosphere  
loses its density and noxious qualities, until at  
length freedom can live and breathe, and justice  
and religion can utter in indignant tones their re-  
probation of the unchristian and barbarous custom  
of slave-holding.

A. McF.

## ANTI-SLAVERY.

From the Friend of Man.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.  
On the subject of Slavery, delivered before the  
New York State Convention, at an Anniver-  
sary Meeting of the New York State Anti-Sla-  
very Society, 20th September, 1837. By AL-  
VAN STEWART, Esq., of Utica.

The argument appearing to the Convention to  
open a new and most highly important view,  
on the subject of slavery, the Convention, in con-  
sonance with the wishes of Mr. Stewart, without  
expressing an opinion as to the correctness of the  
argument, ordered the same to be referred to the  
meeting of the Parent Society, at its anniversary  
in May next, for further consideration, and that in  
the mean time, the Executive Committee cause the  
same to be published, so that it might pass through  
the ordeal of consideration and discussion, before  
the same should be permanently adopted, if found  
correct.

## THE ARGUMENT.

Congress, by the power conferred on it by the  
Constitution, possesses the entire and absolute

right to abolish slavery in every state and territory  
in the Union. This could be effected by the enact-  
ment of a declaration law, in pursuance of, and in  
conformity to the 5th Article of the amendments  
to the Constitution of the United States.—The  
latter part of this Article is almost an extract, in  
words and spirit, from the Magna Charta—the  
great bill of England's liberties.

The latter part of the 5th article of the amend-  
ments to the Constitution of the United States  
says, "Nor shall any person be deprived of life,  
liberty, or property, without due process of law."

Many other essential rights are secured in this  
same article, to the citizen, as, that no person shall  
be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in  
jeopardy of life or limb; and that no man shall be  
compelled to be a witness against himself, in a crimi-  
nal case; but the most essential is the one which  
forbids "any person being deprived of his life,  
liberty, or property, without due process of law."

That Congress should possess power to abolish  
slavery in this nation, without limitation as to  
place, may be startling to some, as a new proposi-  
tion, especially as it has been admitted in the con-  
stitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society, that  
Congress did not possess the power over the slave  
states.

It is humbly submitted, that this admission was  
made by the Parent Anti-Slavery Society, in its  
constitution, and by many constitutions of local  
societies since, as imitations of the parent, without  
bestowing upon the subject the amount of investiga-  
tion which so solemn a subject demanded.

That constitution, though framed by some of the best  
hands and hearts in this land, yet it must be  
remembered was made in the infancy of this  
mighty reformation, when the great questions  
which have since been so ably discussed, had  
hardly been grazed by the inquirers after truth.

But after all, unless slavery has corrupted our  
language, so far as to make it "palter in a double  
sense, and while it keeps the word of promise to  
the ear, it is meant to break it to the hope;" unless  
it has changed the primitive meaning, and eat out  
the very heart and soul of words, employed and  
understood as having certain and fixed ideas, which  
the words represented from the days of King John  
in the Vale of Runnymede, to the day of the  
final adoption of the Federal Constitution; then  
can we have no doubt that every human being in  
this Union, black or white, bond or free, has in-  
valuable blessings secured to him by the 5th article  
of the amendments to the Constitution. The sturdy  
barons and wise men of England, compelled a  
voluntarily King to subscribe Magna Charta 500  
years ago, containing the words of our article; and  
from that day to this, every Englishman and American  
has claimed the invaluable principle, "that no per-  
son should be deprived of his life, liberty, or prop-  
erty, without due process of law," as a part of  
his inheritance and birthright.

The first inquiry we shall institute, is to know  
what is meant by the words, "without due pro-  
cess of law." For it is important to know what  
that "due process of law" can be, which has power  
to deprive a man of his life, liberty, or property.  
And on this subject, it is believed no lawyer in  
this country or England, who is worthy of the ap-  
pellation, will deny that the true and only mean-  
ing of the phrase, "due process of law," is an in-  
dictment or presentment by a grand jury, not  
less than twelve, nor more than twenty-three men;  
and a judgment pronounced on the finding of that  
jury, by a court.

Judge Story, in his commentaries upon the  
Constitution of the United States, page 663,  
speaking of this sentence of this article of the  
constitution, says: "That the other part of the  
clause is but an enlargement of the language of  
Magna Charta—'nec super eum ibimus, nec super  
eum mittimus, nisi per legale iudicium parium suorum  
vel per legem terra'—neither will we pass upon  
him, or condemn him, but by the lawful judgment  
of his peers, or by the law of the land. Lord Coke  
says that these latter words, 'per legem terra',  
(by the law of the land,) mean by 'due  
process of law,' that is, without due presentment  
or indictment, and being brought in to answer  
thereto, 'by due process of law.' So that this  
clause, in effect, affirms the right of trial accord-  
ing to process and proceedings of common law."

In fact, this constitutional provision is nothing  
but one of those invaluable principles, priceless in  
character, drawn from the vast quarry of the  
common law. The framers of the Constitution, fear-  
ing and knowing that a different rule or principle  
prevailed in some of the states, in relation to cer-  
tain unfortunate persons, known under the name  
of slaves, determined to incorporate this branch of  
Magna Charta into the Constitution, as a funda-  
mental law of the confederacy, believing that 500  
years of eventful experience proved its soundness,  
as a chief cornerstone in the edifice of constitu-  
tional liberty. Here it will remain for ever cano-  
nized, not as a new principle, but as an old one  
in a new place.

It must not be forgotten, that before the Revolu-  
tion which separated us from the British empire,  
no provision was made, between the Colonies  
of this country, for the surrender of fugitive slaves.  
Neither was there anything said on the subject of  
slaves, in the articles of confederation, which  
lasted twelve years, as to the restoration of fugi-  
tives. Therefore, so far as the northern states  
were concerned, in the adoption of the constitu-  
tion, they assumed a new and peculiar position  
in relation to slavery, before the world. The North  
having agreed to share equal legislative power with  
the South, in relation to the District of Columbia,  
and the territories where slaves might be; and hav-  
ing obligated themselves, though free states, to  
surrender fugitive slaves; being thus under the  
double obligation of acting in disobedience to the  
plain and unequivocal dictates of humanity, in  
agreeing to surrender the fugitive slave, or rather  
to kidnap him for the benefit of the slave-holder;  
and if this slave should raise the standard of insur-  
rection, in defence of the most emboding and holy  
of human principles (the love of liberty,) the man  
of the North further agreed to smother all respect  
for the nobility of the act, and, in defiance of his  
conscience, go and pour his blood out in the sup-  
pression of that insurrection: all of these engage-  
ments on the part of the man of the North, gave  
him full power to insist on what forms should be  
gone through with, to constitute and make the man  
a slave, whom he was bound to kidnap, and  
restore to his master, and kill on the field of battle  
for the crime of loving and asserting his liberty.  
The men of the free states being free partners  
in the crime of slavery, out of courtesy, might firm-  
ly, as they truly did, insist that the Constitution  
should contain the only *mode* in which slaves  
should be run, and if they were not made in that  
*mode*, with all its forms, they could not exist.

That constitutional mould was in these words:  
"Nor shall any person be deprived of his life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law."

We must bring to the mind, in carrying out the  
true theory of the Federal Constitution, at its for-  
mation, that the whole sovereign people of the  
thirteen states, in legal contemplation, were pre-  
sent, acting in one vast assemblage or body, where  
every thing was understood and discussed, bearing  
on the great subject under consideration.

In theory, there was one vast assembly of the  
American people in the convention, constituting  
the primary elements of society, in its original  
sovereignty, agreeing upon the principles for the  
federal government and union; and it would require  
no great stretch of the imagination, to suppose  
that after providing for the general powers of gov-  
ernment, in peace and war, in relation to foreign  
nations, the states, and Indian tribes, that they  
should have been particularly anxious to erect a  
strong citadel for the protection of man, as man,  
from the tyranny of his fellow-beings.

We may suppose that from one part of the  
Union, a speaker should rise and say, that in the  
section of country from which he came, owing to  
the late troubles of times of the revolutionary war,  
in which committees of safety had from necessity  
assumed supreme power over individuals, that  
even the same practice was continued, without  
any of the legal forms known and observed by the  
common law, for the protection of life or the con-  
viction of the guilty; and that men had been de-  
prived of life by *lynch law*, "without due process  
of law;" and he therefore claimed that no man,  
henceforth, should be deprived of life, except by  
due process of law; while another arises from the  
North, and states, that slavery will never be as-  
sumed as a part of the burden and crime of the  
North, unless it is identified by great constitutional  
marks, by inflexible tests, so that the fugitive  
may be known, and all who are claimed as such,  
may be distinguished as those who have been de-  
prived of liberty. What I mean, says the speaker,  
is, that each man, woman, and child, claimed as  
slaves, before they shall be deprived of liberty,  
shall always have an opportunity, as ample as the  
benignity of the common law, to vindicate their  
freedom, so far as the forms of a trial are concern-  
ed; and they shall not be deprived of their liberty  
and become slaves, except by the indictment of a  
grand jury, and trial by a petit jury, and the judg-  
ment of a court thereon, that the person is a slave,  
and the property of A. And on this trial, let the  
person claimed to be a slave, have the benefit of  
counsel, appointed by the court, if he is unable to  
employ one; let him plead he is not a slave, and  
let the burden of proof lie upon him who claims to  
be proprietor of the supposed slave. Let the per-  
son claimed as a slave have the benefit of compul-  
sory process, to compel the attendance of those by  
whom his freedom may be maintained.

But if the petit jury agree on oath, unanimously,  
that he is a slave, let the judgment of the court be  
pronounced, that he is deprived of his liberty, "by  
due process of law," and let there be a record made  
up, stating these facts as an enduring memorial,  
and filed with the clerk of the court, as a perpetual  
testimony that this person has been deprived of  
his liberty according to the constitution. The man  
of the South rises in convention, and says, that  
many persons are claimed as slaves who are not,  
and others who are, who think they are not. This  
mode of trial will settle the question, so that it may  
not be a matter of unending dispute, and we of  
the South are willing to enter the confederacy on  
these terms, that "no person shall be deprived of  
life, liberty, or property, without due process of  
law."

Thus the great and difficult question was ar-  
ranged, in the formation of the Constitution. Let  
it not be said that the master had, antecedent to  
the Constitution, *vested rights* of property in the  
slave; for, granting that proposition, still the mas-  
ter, for the greater security from his slaves' insur-  
rections and flights, agreed upon a new criterion,  
upon a new definition of slavery, and upon a *slavery*  
which was first *proven* by the course of a  
legal trial, of the most important character.

Another important question arises, which is,  
if the Constitution established the terms on which  
slavery might exist; and if those terms have not  
been complied with, is it not proof positive, at  
least a constitutional presumption, that there are no  
persons in this land, who could legally be proved  
to be slaves, provided the great constitutional for-  
mula is complied with, as this was the only evi-  
dence of slavery recognized by the Constitution,  
and even that has not been complied with in a  
single case in 48 years. The indictment, trial,  
and judgment against a person as a slave, is the  
commission by which the master was authorized  
to exercise those powers over the slave, supposed  
to belong to him as master. Without this commis-  
sion, this constitutional authority, growing out of  
an indictment, trial, and judgment against the slave,  
the act of the master, in exercising dominion over  
the slave, is unconstitutional as for a man, with-  
out commission, election, or appointment, to as-  
sume the duties of sheriff, and hang a man, un-  
tried, but suspected of murder. It would be mur-  
der in the assumed sheriff, because he had no com-  
mission, no matter how guilty the individual who  
was executed. The inquiry is, had the sheriff a  
commission—had he authority to hang?

The only difference between a freeman and a  
slave, under the Constitution, was that the free-  
man was deprived of his liberty by due process of  
law, for crime, and the slave was deprived of his  
liberty by due process of law, simply because he  
was a slave; and the Constitution gave him an op-  
portunity, once in his life, to vindicate his freedom.  
Indictment, trial, and judgment, the white man and  
black man both lose their liberty, and by no other  
process can they constitutionally be deprived of it  
than by *crime*, the other from *misfortune*.

Again in the 3d clause in the 2d section of the  
4th article of the Constitution, which relates in  
part to fugitive slaves, the people have in their  
sovereign capacity, legislated on this subject, say-  
ing that "no person held to service or labor, in  
one state under the laws thereof, escaping into  
another, shall in consequence of any laws or regu-  
lations therein, be discharged from such service,  
or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the  
party to whom such service, or labor, may be  
due."

When the man of South Carolina, pursuing his  
fugitive slave to New Hampshire, comes and de-  
mands his slave to be delivered up; what will the  
granite state, say to the slave-holder of the Palmetto?  
I acknowledge I am bound to make out an  
order and deliver up this fugitive to you, as a  
part of the grand compact of the Constitution,  
provided this fugitive has been deprived of his  
"liberty by due process of law." For that is the  
grand principle on which the men of the free states  
consented that slavery might exist, and only in  
those cases, where the person was deprived of his

liberty, by due process of law, by indictment,  
trial, and judgment against him. Now, says the  
magistrate, I know slavery, in no form or shape  
under the Constitution, except where the slave has  
lost his liberty, by due process of law, and that  
was the tenure by which slaves were to be held in  
the U. S. of America; and by no other, and so  
the North and the South, East and West have  
agreed in the Constitution, and if you can produce  
me a record, or the exemplification of a record,  
showing to me, that a court of competent juris-  
diction, proceeding upon the principles of the com-  
mon law, by the indictment or presentment of a  
grand jury of not less than 12 or more than 23  
men who have found that indictment, or made that  
presentment on oath, and that 12 men on their oath  
as a jury have said on the trial of the fugitive, that  
he was a slave, and a court has pronounced judg-  
ment thereon, then I will make an order for you to  
take the person as your fugitive slave, otherwise  
not. No matter what evidence you produce to  
show that you own the slave, if your title be un-  
broken through five generations of men, and if you  
have a bill of sale from him who claimed the fugi-  
tive's mother and grandmother, that will not an-  
swer.

The word "person" is used for the fugitive slave,  
in the 3d clause of the 2d section of the 4th ar-  
ticle—"No person held to service" &c., The  
word person here means a slave, and in other parts  
of the Constitution the word "persons" is used for  
slaves, as in the 3d clause of the 2d section of  
the first article, speaking of those who shall consti-  
tute the basis of representation in Congress, after  
including the whole number of free persons and  
those bound to labor excluding Indians not taxed,  
and "three fifths of all other persons"—by which  
slaves are intended, in the last part of the sentence.  
The slave is designated under the appellation of  
"persons" in fixing the basis of representation,  
also the word "persons" is employed to denote the  
fugitive slave in the 2d section of the 4th ar-  
ticle, and the words in the 5th article of amend-  
ments to the Constitution, "nor shall any person  
be deprived of life, liberty or property, without  
due process of law," must necessarily include  
slaves. For if it did not, after having previously  
twice used the word "person" where it meant  
slaves, if it did not intend to embrace the slave,  
there would have been an exception in relation to  
the slave. The words of the Constitution, "nor shall  
any person (except slaves) be deprived of their life,  
liberty and property without due process of law,"  
"Any person," is equivalent to every body.

The word "person" when used under the terms  
"three fifths of all other persons" is used to design-  
ate slaves exclusively, in the sense it is there used,  
in the last article.

"No person held to service or labor in one state  
under the laws thereof, escaping &c. 2d section  
4th article.

In this article of the Constitution the words—  
"No person" means, not only slaves, but with ap-  
prentices bound to serve their masters for a limited  
time and the sons or daughters of a parent, being  
minors, and a man's wife, escaping from the per-  
son, to whom their service is due, to another state  
may be delivered up as well as the slave &c.—  
That the words "no person" here, may mean the  
fugitive slave, the bound free apprentice, the wife,  
the son daughter, it is believed none will dispute.

"Every person," in the 5th article of the amend-  
ments to the Constitution covers the whole ground  
of our humanity, and means every body, without  
exception, or in other words, it is as plain as though  
it had said "no human being" now living in the  
United States, or who may hereafter live in said  
states, shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or  
property without an indictment by a grand jury,  
a trial by a petit jury, and the judgment of a court  
thereon.

Before advancing to the other branch of this argu-  
ment, we may be permitted to assume, at this  
stage of our reasoning, that there is not a slave at  
this moment, in the United States upon the terms  
mutually agreed upon, by the people of this coun-  
try, at the formation of the Constitution. If this  
be true, any judge in the United States, who is  
clothed with sufficient authority, to grant a writ of  
Habeas Corpus, and decide upon a return made to  
such a writ; on the master and slave being brought  
before said judge, to inquire by what authority, he  
the master held the slave; if the master could not pro-  
duce a record of conviction, by which the particular  
slave had been deprived of his liberty, by indict-  
ment, trial, and judgment of a court, the judge  
would be obliged under the oath which he must  
have taken, to obey the Constitution of his country,  
to discharge the slave and give him his full lib-  
erty.

2. Upon the same principle, no judge, magis-  
trate, or court in the free or slave states, is au-  
thorized to make an order to deliver up a fugitive slave,  
unless the master produces a record of the convic-  
tion of the slave, showing that he has been de-  
prived of his liberty by an indictment, trial, and  
judgment of a court, or by "due process of law."  
Let it always be borne in mind that the Constitu-  
tion, being a supreme act of the sovereign people,  
and not as distinct sovereignties, in its formation,  
becomes paramount to the constitution, laws,  
or usages of any single state, whenever and where-  
ver they conflict. So fully sensible that the Consti-  
tution of the United States would be but a rope  
of sand, unless the same, and the laws made in  
pursuance of it, by the Congress, were paramount  
to all state constitutions and legislation, that the  
American people did not choose to leave it as a mat-  
ter of inference, but incorporated the same into the  
Constitution of the United States.

"Congress shall have power to make all laws  
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying  
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other  
powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-  
ment of the United States, or in any department  
or officer thereof;" 18th clause of the 8th section  
1st article.

But more particularly the second section of the  
6th article of the Constitution of the United  
States establishes the proposition, which is,  
"This Constitution and the Laws of the United  
States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof,  
and all treaties made, or which shall be made,  
under the authority of the United States, shall be  
the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every  
state shall be bound thereby; any thing in the Con-  
stitution or law of the state to the contrary not-  
withstanding."

It seems to have been a matter of very great anxi-  
ety among the politicians of the slave states, to  
satisfy the American people that slavery was an in-  
stitution, recognized in the Constitution of the  
United States.

To be sure they have had great disagreement  
among themselves as to the article or section of

that instrument in which this tremendous power of  
man over man was lodged, some finding it in one  
article, and some in another; but they have all  
agreed it does exist some where, in this revered in-  
strument. Admitting that the monster slavery is  
permitted to exist with limitations and restrictions,  
in the Constitution, we contend that it can exist  
no otherwise, than as the Constitution has said it shall  
exist, which is that "no person shall be deprived of  
his liberty, except by due process of law."

Until this great constitutional pre-requisite has  
been complied with, no man in the nation can  
have a Constitutional deed of another's body, and  
the control of its powers. The slaveholder has  
never seen fit to comply with the great compact  
agreed on, in the Constitution, by which which the  
power to hold a slave, was created.

But the slaveholder has assumed a jurisdiction  
over the slave, in the



each individual, or "persons" of this Republic in a condition to enjoy the full benefit of a Jury trial before a Court—proceeding upon the principles of the common law, before liberty can be taken away, can it be tolerated, that States and individuals of slave States by the boldest tyranny, shall seize upon and demand 2,500,000 of American citizens of their liberty, and convert them into slave property, in the face of their own high and sacred rights, which were secured by the strongest dicta of patriotism in giving full play and action to the Constitution, by imparting the blessings, contained within its mighty folds.

Congress has full power therefore to pass a law abolishing slavery, in substance, in the following words:—  
“Whereas the People of the United States by the Constitution ordained that no person should be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, by indictment by a grand jury and the judgment of a court; and whereas the People of the United States, who pretend to hold slaves by the laws of several States, have never established their title to their alleged slaves by due process of law, during the forty-eight years, which have elapsed since the mode of creating a slave was ordained by the sovereign people of these United States: Therefore be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, in Congress assembled, that all persons in the United States, who were not deprived of their liberty and made slaves by indictment by a grand jury, trial by a petit jury, and judgment of a court, previous to the first day of January 1837, be and the same are hereby declared to be free persons, any constitution of any State or law, or other, or usage judicial or legislative in any State of this nation, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.”

From the reasoning pursued in this paper, it appears manifest that every fugitive slave, who has been delivered up, ought to have had his liberty, that every order made for the delivery of slaves to these supposed masters, have been made, without the evidence required by the Constitution.

A further deduction seems legitimate from these premises, that we of the North are not bound to uphold slavery in any form, as we have not the evidence agreed on by the Constitution, that there is a slave in the United States. All presumptions are to be made in favor of liberty, until the Record evidence, by due process of law appears, by which the slave has been deprived of liberty according to the Constitution of the United States.

We are bound to do but one thing, which is to petition Congress, without ceasing, until Congress passes a declaratory act, in affirmation of the great principles of human liberty established by the American people, and to demand the Constitution of the United States, by which every slave unconstitutionally deprived of his liberty, may lift up his head and rejoice for the hour of his redemption.

If it be true that Congress have entire power over the question of slavery, and a right to put an end to the unconstitutional slavery which now exists, it is not a matter of rejoicing that in all future efforts of our cause, we will be directed, not against slavery in detail, in what may be called the District of Columbia, or the internal slave trade between the States, but against it as a whole, as an entirety. We can fence in the whole field. How thankful should we be, if the foregoing proposition be true, that the responsibility of slavery rests on the entire American people, and that its overthrow does not depend upon the conversion of slaveholding States, but upon our own efforts, by which we can have complete power over the question.

For all this, let us give thanks to the Most High.  
Resolutions in conformity with the preceding argument—submitted, not for present adoption, but for discussion and deliberation.

1. Resolved, as the sense of this Convention, that the people of the United States in their sovereign and primary capacity, having made and adopted the Constitution of the United States as paramount to all State constitutions, State legislation, or State judicial decisions, we therefore believe that the Constitution of the United States in the 5th Article of amendments, imperiously and forever settled and fixed the mode by which a man might become a slave in this confederacy, in those words which say, “no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” which, we believe, means that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without an indictment by a grand jury, a trial upon the principles of the common law by a petit jury, and a judgment pronounced, on the finding of said petit jury, by

2. Resolved, That we believe that the true interpretation of the 5th Article of the Constitution forever settled in this land the test or mode by which a slave might be created within the great constitutional compact, which was that, before the man could become property or a slave within the constitutional definition, the man must have been indicted by a grand jury, tried by a petit jury, judgment pronounced against him by a court, proceeding upon the principles of the common law, and a record of said conviction made and filed with the clerk of said court as perpetual memorial and record evidence, that the man had a trial and been deprived of his liberty, by due process of law within the meaning of this Article of the Constitution of the United States.

3. Resolved, That we are convinced to the conclusion expressed in the foregoing resolutions, from the words “persons” and “person,” having in other parts of the constitution been employed to designate slaves, and also used to signify slaves and freemen, and there being no exception made in the 5th Article of amendments, where the word “person” is used again, upon all reasonable principles of construction, we are satisfied to believe that no person, bound or free, can be deprived of his “liberty” without due process of law, which we defined, as we believe it is understood by eminent jurists, both ancient and modern.

4. Resolved, Believing the truth of the three preceding propositions, we do not believe there is a slave in this nation, held according to the great agreement made by the sovereign people in the Constitution, and inasmuch as that Constitution is paramount to all state constitutions or legislation, on all points where it speaks:

Therefore, Resolved, That there is not a legal slave in the land, and one held constitutionally; therefore they are now free, any law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; because the people of the slave States have not deprived their alleged slaves of “liberty” by “due process of law,” that is to say, by the trial awarded to each person in the constitution before he or she could become a slave.

5. Resolved, That every magistrate or judge who makes an order to deliver a fugitive slave, in this nation, to any person claiming said fugitive, as his property, acts illegally and contrary to the express letter and spirit of the 5th Article of the amendments to the constitution of the U. S., unless the claimant of said fugitive, produces to such magistrate or judge a record of conviction against the fugitive, showing that the identical fugitive has been indicted by a grand jury, tried by a petit jury, and judgment in pursuance of the finding of the petit jury, has been pronounced against said fugitive, by a court proceeding upon the benign principles of the common law, by “due process of law,” that is to say, by the trial awarded to each person in the constitution before he or she could become a slave.

6. Resolved, That inasmuch as 48 years have gone by, or near two generations of men since the great constitutional compact of slavery was fixed and agreed upon in that instrument, therefore it is a fair legal presumption, that slaveholders did not feel able to prove their title to their slaves by the form laid down in the Constitution, as the only way or manner by which they could get a legal constitutional title, therefore they seized upon the persons of their slaves, and have held them, not under but in defiance of, the most explicit provisions of the Constitution of country.

7. Resolved, That Congress has power to pass a declaratory act, in pursuance of the 5th Article of amendments to the Constitution of the U. S., declaring that all persons in the United States, having full power for 48 years or more from the formation of the Constitution of the U. S., to deprive those persons who were slaves of their liberty, by due process of law, by indictment, trial and judgment of a court, having done so; but having in various states, hidden many persons as slaves, contrary to the Constitution, that all persons, who on the first day of January 1837, were held as slaves, but who have not been deprived of their liberty, by indictment, trial, and judgment, according to the constitutional provision aforesaid, might be declared to be free, the constitution of any state, the laws thereof, or any practice, or custom, or usage, whether judicial or legislative, of such state to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.

From the N. Y. Com. Adv., May 12.  
Destructive Fires.

Yesterday afternoon about 3 o'clock a fire broke out in some stables in the centre of the black bounded by Pitt, Whitt, Livingston and Stanton on St.

The stables were occupied by Messrs Kegan, Riley, Mc Cormick and Powell, and were entirely destroyed, and one horse consumed in the flames.

The conflagration spread with great rapidity, the wind being fresh from the north-east, and in the course of two hours upwards of fifty families were turned out of their houses and home to shift for themselves as they best could, and over twenty houses were consumed or injured.

## THE PHILANTHROPIST.

EDITED BY G. BAILEY, JR.

CINCINNATI:  
Tuesday Morning, MAY 22, 1838.

### REMARKS ON MR. STEWART'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.

That Congress by the Constitution has no right to legislate for the abolition of slavery in any of the States of this confederacy, has always been an article in our political creed. We have invariably regarded this point as fully decided, by the absence of any clause in the constitution conferring such a right, by the well-known intentions of the framers of that instrument, by the votes of Congress, and by the fixed opinions of the people of the United States for forty-eight years. We must confess then, that the position assumed by Mr. Stewart was indeed “startling” to us; still, our former belief did not prevent us from examining, with great care and as much candor as we could command, all that he found himself able to urge in its defence. The result was, a clear and firm conviction that the writer had totally failed in making out his case.

If the reader will analyze the argument of Mr. Stewart, he will perceive, that the whole force of his reasoning depends upon a novel construction given to the clause in the fifth Article of amendments, which provides that, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” His assumption is, that this clause guards with equal force the rights of every “human being in this Union, black or white, bond or free.” If this be true, then it follows that every slave, born or brought into this country during the last forty-eight years, is of right and in fact a freeman, and Mr. Stewart's position is fairly sustained.—Congress has power by the Constitution to pass an act, carrying into effect this provision in the case of slavery in the States. If false, his position falls to the ground, together with the numerous inferences and illustrations which constitute the largest portion of his article.

There remains but a single question to settle.—Is this novel construction of the clause in consideration true or false?—In other words, Is this the construction mutually agreed upon by the original parties to the Federal compact?

Mr. Stewart, aware that the simple letter of an instrument ought not to be interpreted without reference to its general tenor and the recorded intentions of its framers, attempts to support the affirmative of this question, by four distinct assumptions, and a brief comment on the use of the term, “person”—all of which are designed to prove that the application he has made of the clause in question, is the very application which those who formed and those who adopted the Federal Constitution, intended should be made. No other proof is offered throughout the article, than such as is furnished in these assumptions and this comment. The assumptions are made in the following order.

1. One of the reasons why this clause was incorporated in the constitution was, the existence of slavery in the States; or in his own language,—“The framers of the constitution, fearing and knowing that a different rule or principle prevailed in some of the States, in relation to certain unfortunate persons, known under the name of slaves, determined to incorporate this branch of Magna Charta into the constitution, as a fundamental law of the confederacy.”

2. The North, having made itself a partaker in the crime of slavery, by assenting to the several provisions in the constitution relating to it, “out of courtesy, might firmly, as it did truly, insist that the constitution should contain the only mould in which slaves should be run, and if they were not made in that mould, with all its forms, they could not exist.” (The “mould” is the clause so often referred to.)

3. “In theory,” at the time of the Federal Convention, “there was one vast assembly of the American people.” “A man of the North” arises and says—We of the North will never assume a part of the burden and guilt of any slavery, except such as shall be made “by due process of law.” What I mean is, that each man, woman and child, claimed as a slave, shall not become such, “except by the judgment of a grand jury, and trial by a petit jury, and the judgment of the court thereon, that the person is a slave and the property of A.”

“The man of the South” then rises and says, that “many persons are claimed as slaves who are not, and others who are, who think they are not. This mode of trial will settle the question; and we of the South are willing to enter the confederacy on these terms, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “Thus the great and difficult question was arranged, in the formation of the Constitution.”

4. The master, “for the greater security from his slaves’ insurrections and flights, agreed upon a new criterion of slavery,” a slavery which should first be “proven by the course of a legal trial.”

These are Mr. Stewart's assumptions, boldly announced, but unsupported by one argument, a single fact, or the most indirect reference to the records of the times when the Constitution was framed, of the proceedings of the Convention that framed it, or of the state conventions that ratified it.

We now ask him, on what authority he makes such assertions? Where is the record, or what the tradition which emboldens Mr. Stewart to declare, that a special reference to the condition of slaves; an unwillingness on the part of the North to suffer any of the relations of slavery to be adjusted by the constitution, unless that slavery were created by due process of law; a desire on the part of the slaveholders “for greater security from their slaves’ insurrections and flights,” were the motives which led to the incorporation of this clause of Magna Charta into the Federal Constitution. From what document hitherto undiscovered, does he learn, that the subject of slavery was under full discussion in the Convention of '87, and that then and there the North insisted and the South assented, that there should be no slaves except those who should be made such, “by the indictment of a grand jury, and trial by a petit jury, and the judgment of the court thereon,” that A, B, and C, were slaves? Can it be that a gentleman of so much intelligence has ventured on so bold announcements without his vouchers? If not, let him produce them; it is due to the American people that they should be made familiar with author-

ities which warrant assertions, so much at variance with all that has been handed down by record or tradition.

But want of proof is not the chief objection we have to oppose to these assumptions.—Positive history clearly shows that they are groundless. History records, that this grand provision of Magna Charta which Mr. Stewart insists so much; this provision which was adopted by the “framers” of the constitution, because they feared and knew a different rule prevailed in relation to slaves; this provision for a constitutional slavery, without the adoption of which, the North would not come into a Union having any relations to slavery; this constitutional, this only “mould” for running slaves; this “new criterion of slavery,” which the South assented to for the sake of “greater security from slaves’ insurrections and flights;”—composed no part of the original constitution, but was ingrafted into it, some years after this instrument had been ratified by the states, North and South, with all its obnoxious and criminal regulations in relation to slavery.

The Federal Convention finished their labors, September 17th 1787, and the constitution they had prepared was submitted to the states severally for their final decision. A sufficient number having ratified it, the first Congress under the new government assembled March 4th, 1789, and sat till September 28th of the same year. During the session, a committee was appointed to consider and report on, various amendments which had been recommended by the state-conventions, after their adoption of the Constitution. The committee reported, and “at length, ten articles in addition to, and amendment of the constitution, were assented to by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, and proposed to the legislatures of the several states,” by which they were finally ratified. Among these was the article that contains the clause on which Mr. Stewart's argument is based. This statement of facts, it is presumed, will not be disputed; but, if it be true, it proves,

1st, That it cannot be truly said, that the framers of the constitution, knowing and fearing that another principle or rule of action prevailed in some parts of the country, incorporated this branch of Magna Charta into our compact of Union,—because the provision was not made a part of the Constitution until at least two years after the ratification of that instrument by the States.

2ly, That it is true neither in fact nor theory, that the adoption of this clause was made a term of Union by what Mr. Stewart has called, the free states,—because the Union with all its sinful provisions with regard to slavery was formed two years before the ratification of the amendment containing this supposed term.

3ly, That the South, whatever might have been done subsequently, did not at the period to which Mr. Stewart refers, agree upon a new criterion of slavery,—because the introduction of this supposed criterion was of later date.

But it may be said, that this is a mere question of time; no matter whether the claim in question was incorporated into the compact of Union at the period of its formation or subsequent to it,—the incorporation, when it did take place, was brought about under the circumstances and from the motives, stated by Mr. Stewart.

If this were true, it might naturally be expected that the northern states would have manifested great solicitude concerning slavery, and the incorporation into the constitution of some clause conferring on Congress the power to abolish it in the States.

But did they manifest any inordinate anxiety on this point? We grant that public sentiment in a large majority of the states was hostile to slavery and regarded it as a sore evil, destined soon to disappear under the manifold influences springing out of the revolutionary conflict, the universal agitation of the human mind on the subject of man's rights, and above all, the dissemination of the humanizing truths of christianity. But, we are not aware that any attempt was made in the Convention of '87 to take the remedy for this evil out of the hands of the states; and there are facts enough on record to satisfy any mind that such an attempt, if it had been made and persevered in, would have been fatal to any prospect of Union. It is well known that, even the article in relation to the slave-trade was an article of compromise, and that South Carolina and Georgia positively refused to be parties to any constitution that would empower Congress to put an immediate end to this nefarious traffic. Northern men knew this, and were evidently aware of the sensitiveness of the slaveholding states on the subject of Federal interference with slavery; and therefore, in their several state-conventions, assembled to decide on the question of adopting the new constitution, while they were free in their expressions of abhorrence against the principle and practice of slavery, they never, so far as we are aware, objected to the Constitution because it did not confer on Congress the right of abolishing slavery in the States.

In the Massachusetts convention, allusions to the subject of slavery were frequent, but the only questions were, shall we do any thing by ratifying this constitution “to hold the blacks in bondage,” or “shall we become partakers of other men's sins?” We have examined the records of the debates in this convention, and have not been able to find that the propriety of conferring power on Congress to legislate on this subject, was advocated by a single member. All seemed to recognize the independence of the states individually in this matter, and there was not even a hint thrown out, that Massachusetts, seeing she was about to pledge herself to a compact which involved her in the guilt of slavery, ought to insist on the adoption by the other states of a provision determining how and in what manner slavery should be created.

The same remark applies to the conventions in New York and Pennsylvania. None of them seems to have conceived of the ingenious plan of reaching slavery through the medium of Federal action, which Mr. Stewart after the lapse of fifty years has so happily hit upon.

What! did not Massachusetts—that noble state, that state consecrated to liberty, the blood of whose sons was first offered up on the altar of Freedom,—did not Massachusetts, conscience-stricken and abashed, at having entered into a solemn engagement to re-deliver fugitives from a cruel bondage, and put down slave-insurrections, even at the point of the bayonet,—did not Massachusetts insist upon

the adoption of some proposition that would in a degree lighten her guilt? Did she not recommend some “constitutional mould” in which slaves should be “run”? Did she not insist on making her own conditions as to the kind of slavery she had engaged to uphold? Did she not urge as an indispensable condition to her continuing in the confederacy, that no kind of slavery should be entitled to constitutional protection, except a slavery created by “due process of law”? Did she not, in a word, having become a participant in the guilt of slavery, demand that no slave should be made such, except on “presentment of a grand jury, trial by a petit jury, and decision of a judge thereupon”? Alas! such evidences of a penitent spirit are not to be found. Massachusetts, on ratifying the Constitution, recommended nine alterations or amendments, but not one of these by the utmost latitude of construction could be understood as having any thing to do with slavery. The only article among them all which respects personal rights, provides as follows:

“That no person shall be tried for any crime, by which he may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, until he be first indicted by a grand jury, except in such cases as may arise in the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”

This of course has nothing to do with slaves. None of the other states which were about to become free, manifested more feeling on this point than Massachusetts. So totally opposed are Mr. Stewart's suppositions to every record of those times; so groundless is the assertion, that “the man of the North” insisted, as a condition to his entering the confederacy with the “man of the South,” that no slaves should be made such, except by “due process of law.”

Once more—and we trust that the total fallacy of Mr. Stewart's assumptions will be made plain to every mind. This grand safeguard of liberty, this clause which constitutes with Mr. Stewart the only “mould” in which slaves were to be “run,” was recommended by a slaveholding state—a state peculiarly jealous of Federal prerogatives.—It was recommended by Virginia.

June 27th, 1788, the Convention of Virginia ratified the Federal Constitution, but recommended as amendments several provisions reported by Mr. Wythe, among which was the following:

“No freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land.”

This of course was the basis of the clause of the fifth Article, (so often alluded to,) which was adopted by Congress, submitted to the state-legislatures, and now composes an essential part of our Constitution. So it seems, that it was the “man of the South” and not “the man of the North,” who proposed this important clause for adoption; and that, from the language in which the proposition is couched, nothing was further from his thoughts than to have the provision apply to slaves—than to establish a “new criterion of slavery.”

“No freeman,” &c., is the language.

It may be said, that although this restriction was contemplated by the Convention of Virginia, Congress, by substituting the term “person” in the amendment adopted by them, gave sufficient evidence of their disapprobation of the restriction, and of their intention to extend the provision to “every human being in the Union.”

The objection is set aside at once by the fact, that the substitution of the term “person” for “freeman” occasioned no uneasiness among southern members; but this could not have been, if Congress had designed by the clause so amended, to establish a rule for making slaves, which would entirely have changed the relation of master and slave, and speedily have subverted the very foundations of state-slavery. Southern members, as history clearly testifies, were too jealous of Federal interference on this subject, and too vigilant against all foreign attempts to deprive them of their slaves, to acquiesce for a moment in any such design, or to suffer a trick to be played off on them by the incorporation of a clause, which northern members purposed at some future day to use for the overthrow of slavery. The records of the debates in the first Congress on the various amendments presented do not show that any such fear was entertained, that any discussion took place respecting the bearings of this clause on slavery, or that the substitution of “person” for “freeman,” occasioned excitement or uneasiness of any kind.

The necessary inference is, that it was well understood at the time by all the parties concerned, that the provision, like all other provisions in the Constitution for the security of personal rights, recognized a standing and an acknowledged exception in the case of slaves. The true and only reasons for the preference of the term “person,” are to be found in the fact that the Constitution was designed not only for slaveholding, but non-slaveholding states, and in the policy which had uniformly influenced the framers of the constitution to avoid (whenever possible) every term or phrase, which could awaken the obnoxious idea of slavery, and indicate its existence in the Union.

So much for the assumptions of Mr. Stewart. A few remarks in regard to his comment on the word “person,” and we shall conclude this article.

The whole argument on this point may be summed up as follows.

“Persons,” is a term used in the Constitution to designate slaves in one instance, and slaves or freemen as the case may be, in two other instances; therefore, when the term is used in the following provision—“nor shall any ‘person’ be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”—slaves as well as freemen are meant.

After what has been said, the unsoundness of this argument can easily be made manifest.

The whole history of the formation of our Union proves, as we have already seen, that slaves had nothing to do with the framing of the Federal Constitution; that they were in no proper sense parties to the compact; that they were never made a subject of discussion any further than the convenience and safety of the masters required; that none of the provisions or guarantees of the Constitution was designed to apply to them; but that by the tacit agreement of all parties, they were to constitute a standing exception to all recognitions and securities of rights, incorporated into the com-

act of Union. Slaves therefore are never to be understood as designated by the Constitution, unless they be definitely pointed out by the context and the peculiar nature of the provisions of which they are the subjects. Now the term, “persons,” in the three instances wherein it confessedly applies to slaves, is used under such circumstances and in connection with such provisions, as plainly indicate that slaves were meant. Nevertheless even here, the precise meaning of the term is to be ascertained by referring to the intentions of the framers of the constitution, and the circumstances under which they performed their labors.

Such reference in one instance, proves that, when the term, “persons,” is used, slaves are meant; in two instances, that slaves or freemen, as the case may be, are indicated; and in all other instances, that freemen alone are designated.

The clause therefore, if it had been designed to reach the case of slaves, should have been placed, as in the three instances just mentioned, in such a context as might have prevented all doubt; it should have been framed after this fashion: “Nor shall any person, not even the children of those held to service under the laws of any state, or persons imported into this country from the date of the adoption of this amendment to the year 1808, be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”

We ask Mr. Stewart seriously; whether he verily believes that this was the true meaning intended by the Convention of Virginia when it recommended the amendment, by the first Congress when it assented to it, and by the legislatures of the several states when they ratified it? If such be his belief, certainly he ought to be able to bring to its support, other arguments than mere assumptions and verbal criticisms; for as such we must regard the only evidences he has offered to sustain his bold position.

In conclusion we would remark, that in our judgment, it is unwise to attempt to relieve ourselves as a nation of the guilt of upholding slavery. Our Constitution does recognize the fact of its existence in the states; it did allow under all the protections of the Federal government the piratical traffic in human beings for nearly 20 years; it does bind the free states to a participation in the tremendous responsibilities of slavery, by requiring them to re-deliver fugitive slaves, and to suppress, when called upon, insurrections among slaves, even at the cost of their extermination. The North entered into this criminal compact—for criminal it was and is, and no sophistry or ambiguity of language can make it otherwise—with its eyes wide open, never insisting that Congress should have power to abolish slavery in the states, and making no conditions whatever as to the kind of slavery it would pledge itself to support. It did nothing to alleviate the guilt it was about to incur; and we cannot but regard any attempt at this late day to relieve the free states from any portion of their criminality in this compact of iniquity, by disseminating the idea that they stand pledged only to a slavery that has been or may be created “by due process of law,” as too much like a trick to extricate them from the guilty predicament in which they have placed themselves. Besides, it looks too much as if it were designed to over-reach the slaveholder and deprive him of his slaves by a technical artifice—by a mere rule of legal construction, which, however important on the whole in the interpretation of written contracts, no man has a right to avail himself of, to accomplish what he knows was never intended.

Having expressed ourself thus plainly, we owe it to the high-minded and able author of this Constitutional argument, to disclaim in the most explicit terms the slightest intention of charging him with unfairness or insincerity or any sinister design in the promulgation of his novel opinion. On the contrary, we have no doubt, that in this movement, as in all his indefatigable efforts in behalf of the slave, he is actuated by pure and fervent philanthropy.

We call the attention of our friends in the city and vicinity to the following notice. Let there be a full attendance. The meeting last Friday Evening was interesting and spirited. It is high time the cause should be vigorously pushed forward in this place.

Anti-Slavery Meeting.

The Cincinnati Anti-Slavery Society will meet on next Friday evening at half past seven o'clock, at the residence of Dr. Colby, Vine st. 2d door south of 7th street, East side. Mr. Boyle will deliver an Address.

A. HOPKINS, Sec.

In our next number we intend to publish full reports of the proceedings of the Great Methodist Anti-Slavery Convention at Utica, and the American Anti-Slavery Society at its late Anniversary.

Abolition in the Methodist Episcopal Church. Orange Scott stated at the late Anniversary in New York, “that three years ago, scarcely twenty-five of that denomination (the Methodist), were known as decided abolitionists. Now, there were 2,000 ministers, and from forty to fifty thousand members, who were heart and hand with the friends of Emancipation.”

At the Great Convention in Utica, New York, May 2d and 3d, 200 delegates were present from the following twelve Annual Conferences: New England, N. Hampshire, Maine, New York, Philadelphia, Troy, Oneida, Black River, Genesee, Erie, Michigan and Baltimore. New Jersey, Pittsburgh, Ohio, and Illinois Conferences were represented by communications. Indiana, was the only one in the free states not represented. Out of 28 Annual Conferences, 16 were therefore represented. The communications, “numbering about 150,” were from 12 different states; a large portion of them from Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. They are to be published from time to time in the Zion's Watchman, and other Methodist papers, as the “Committee of Correspondence” may direct. They were signed by 600 names—“mostly of travelling and local preachers, and official members of the church.” Numerous resolutions were passed, a Declaration of Sentiments was put forth, and a committee appointed to prepare an address to the members of the M. E. Church. Rev. Luther Lee was appointed to represent the anti-slavery cause, as it is connected with the M. E. Church, to the Wesleyan Conference in Canada, at its next session, and to enlist the influence of that body in favor of “our cause.” Rev. Orange

Scott was appointed a delegate to attend the next session of the Wesleyan Conference in England, for the same purposes.

The editors of Zion's Watchman say, that “all things considered,” the Convention “exceeded their most sanguine expectations.”

Anniversary at New York.

A letter from our dear friend Mr. Birney, furnishes a brief notice of this Anniversary. In another letter he informs us, that Rev. David Root, “formerly pastor of the 2d Presbyterian church in Cincinnati, was appointed to represent the Parent Society at our Anniversary.”

Depository of the Ohio A. S. Society.

I presume the private library of most of the reading abolitionists of our country has a greater variety, and commonly a greater quantity of books in it than this establishment. Excepting the pamphlets, I presume I could put the whole concern into my pockets, and travel off with it without much inconvenience. A few days since I went to Cincinnati, for the purpose of obtaining one or two anti-slavery books, recently published. I went up Main street, till I saw, in large letters, “OHIO ANTI-SLAVERY OFFICE.” What was my surprise on entering, to find a beggarly account of empty shelves. I felt ashamed that the head quarters of our powerful society should have so little ammunition for aggressive warfare. The book which I particularly wanted was not to be had. I sat down a few minutes to read some of the exchange papers, of which there were a large number. In the course of ten or fifteen minutes a stranger came in, and inquired for anti-slavery books—wished to get a full set. The agent told him that a lot was expected on every day. Having some leisure I called daily, till the book arrived. Persons called for books almost every time that I was in. The agent told me that several hundred copies of “James Williams” had been called for within a week or two. In the box which came there were nine of “Thome & Kimball's Journal.” This was to supply Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Kentucky.—I supplied myself, however, took the book home and read it—and have no hesitation in saying that it is one of the most thrillingly interesting narratives that I have ever read. The safety and expediency of immediate emancipation is established beyond a doubt—beyond a cavil. No honest inquirer after truth can read it without being convinced. It takes the reader as by magic into the midst of emancipated slaves joying in their freedom, and of masters rejoicing in their increased wealth and increased happiness and safety. Aside from its literary merits, which are of the first order, it is a rich legacy left to the American people, finely illustrating the superiority of liberty over slavery—of freedom over oppression.

The thanks of the civilized world are due to Messrs. Thome & Kimball for their zeal and faithfulness in collecting and arranging facts and arguments which so clearly and forcibly show the superiority of liberal principles over all others.

All money that can be raised for one year to come should be appropriated in printing and distributing this book. It will abolish the world. It will remove all objections but such as spring from negro-prejudice. I hope the Ohio Anti-Slavery Society will obtain immediately 500 or 1,000 copies for the supply of the western country. The nine that came in the “lot” were gone almost as soon as they touched the shore.

I hope the society will this year appropriate a sum of money sufficiently large to furnish a handsome assortment of books, and keep the money in this department.

Letter from J. G. Birney—Anniversary at New York.

Anti-Slavery Office, N. York, May 9, 1838.  
My Dear Friend,—Our Convention were employed in business till late evening. The Boston clerical appeal, &c., have been disposed of in a way which is satisfactory, I believe, to all. The Constitutional question introduced by Mr. Alvan Stewart, was not re-regitated after its rejection. The Anniversary meeting held yesterday was, in my apprehension, the most effective one we have yet had—at least of the three that I have attended. The speakers were Mr. Quincy, of Boston, Dr. James McCune Smith, a colored gentleman of this city, Mr. Gerrit Smith, and Mr. Alvan Stewart.

There was in the meeting evidently a friendly feeling toward the cause. The class of mind in attendance was if any thing higher than at any meeting heretofore. The whole went off, in my view, exceedingly favorably. I will give you an instance, showing its influence. A highly respected and influential clergyman of Massachusetts, now filling a responsible station under that Commonwealth, wrote to me on the subject of uniting with the Society, but two days before our Anniversary. He had four reasons—and he drew them out at some length—for not joining the Society. It turned out, however, that he was present. When the meeting was over he came to me, and said—“If my name will be of any service to you, you may put it to the Constitution.”

The speech of Dr. Smith did immense execution. It was well done in every way. He is a mullato, of good figure, and very prepossessing, manly countenance. His style of speaking is easy and rapid. I saw a gentleman—one who has been, if he is not now, greatly opposed to us—weeping like a child while Dr. Smith was speaking. The effect, you may be sure, was very great.

There was nothing that occurred in this meeting to mar its influence in the slightest degree. I write you this, in advance of the full account, which you will doubtless receive in the Emancipator of to-morrow.

Yours truly, JAMES G. BIRNEY.

The Annexation-Gamble.

It is amusing to watch the shallow artifices of slaveholders, in their efforts to prevail on Uncle Sam to adopt Texas into his family. Now they would urge him with the plea of natural relationship, telling him that Texas is his own lawful child, and that he has a right to reclaim her with a parent's authority. Then they would provoke his paternal affection, by persuading Texas to withdraw her petition for admittance to his favor. Then they would frighten him out of his wits with fearful hints of the danger of losing her forever, because John Bull begins to look kindly on her and is seriously meditating how he shall make her his own. So, as the Frankfort Commonwealth most expressively says, “while we are disputing, the lion takes away the oyster, and leaves the shell.”

The latest alarm-intelligence we have seen, is the following, copied by the Commonwealth from a New Orleans Paper.

Recognition of Texian Independence by England.—The consequent defeat of Annexation and loss to the United States of the commerce of this young but growing Republic.—We have been favored with the perusal of a letter from London, dated the 15th day of February last, which affords much information in regard to the subjects which head this article. We would premise that the writer of the letter had every opportunity of correct information, and that whatever he says is entitled to the most implicit confidence.

It is stated that the most friendly dispositions were evinced by the British government towards Texas. The delay in recognizing has resulted mainly from the outbreaking of the Canadian revolution. Another cause assigned







